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A number of attempts have been made to explain the functiona 1 
status of the granunatical or surface subject of a sentence. These 
attempts have been from a variety of theoretical perspectives, but 
essentially what they all try to do is to relate the function of 
the grammatical subject to some sort of cognitive function. (I 
should mention here at the outset that in this discussion I am 
deliberately ignoring considerations of subjecthood based on syn-
tactic or morphological properties or even a multi-factor concept 
of subject such as that of Keenan (1976). My principal focus here 
is on the cognitive functions related to subjecthood.) The pre-
vious research I have in mind has examined the functional relation-
ship of subjecthood to other cognitive functions such as "topic," 
in the sense of topic versus co1m1ent (Li & Thompson 1976; Hornby 
1971, 1972). "theme," in the sense of theme versus rheme (Halliday 
1967, 1970), "focus," in the sense of focus versus presupposition 
(Hornby 1974), "given information," in the sense of given versus 
new information (Chafe 1974, 1976; Hornby 1972; Haviland & Clark 
1974; Clark & Haviland 1977; Clark & Clark 1977), the "figure" of 
a figure-ground relation (Carroll 1958), or the research has 
focussed on the cognitive function of subject as an "interest-ob-
ject" (Carroll 1958), or as the "conceptual focus" (Tannenbaum & 
Williams 1968, James 1972), the most "prominent" or important ele-
ment in the sentence (Johnson-Laird l968a, 1968b; Hornby, Hass & 
Feldman 1970), the "focus of attention" (Olson & Filby 1972), and 
so on. (See Sandmann 1954 for a comprehensive review of what 
people have said about subjects.) 
While there is still a widely held view that the status of a 
noun as surface subject of a sentence is a strictly syntactic 
status, with only indirect cognitive relevance at best, it seems 
to me and to many of the researchers mentioned above that it is 
a priori unlikely that such prominent status in English and in 
many other languages would be only arbitrary and would not play 
some important cognitive role as well. However, it should not be 
surprising to find that, in the course of a language's history, 
the role of grammatical or surface subject has been confounded 
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with other roles and that subject might not be associated consist-
ently or necessarily with any single one of the cognitive functions 
previously listed. For example, although in most instances in 
English the subject represents "given information," this need not 
be the case. It is possible to structure an English sentence so 
that the functions served by given and new and by subject and pre-
dicate are signalled separately. Consider, for example, the sen-
tence: 
The POLICE investigated the robbery. 
In this example, the subject "police" is not given but rather new 
information as signalled by the contrastive stress. According to 
Clark & Clark (1977), this example of the possible separation of 
the cognitive roles served by given versus new information, on the 
one hand, and by subject versus predicate, on the other hand, shows 
the difference between the 1 istener-orientation of the given-new 
contrast, and the speaker-orientation of the subject-predicate con-
trast. 
The "speaker"-oriented nature of the cognitive function served 
by grammatical subjects appears to be generally agreed upon (Chafe 
1976). However, beyond this general agreement, none of the afore-
mentioned available cognitive accounts of s11bjecthood is entirely 
satisfactory. Suitbert Ertel (1977), a German psychologist, has 
offered an interesting alternative viewpoint of the psychological 
function of grammatical subject, and it is that view that this 
paper investigates. 
Ertel (1977) offers an explanation of the psychological/cogni-
tive role of surface subject in terms of the ego perspective of the 
speaker. Specifically, in order to explain why speakers choose to 
produce one from among a set of logically equivalent sentences 
such as Paul met Mary, Mary met Paul, and Paul and Mary met, Ertel 
has proposed a theory of sentence construction which involves 
what he calls the mental "seizing" (sic) of a cognitive unit to be 
the grammatical subject determined by the ego perspective of the 
speaker. The speaker seizes as the grammatical subject the cogni-
tive unit closest to his ego. Cf. Figure 1, next page. 
According to Ertel, in the phenomenal field of the speaker, 
1.e. in his current state of consciousness, there are a number of 
cognitive units, including the speaker himself. Any of these 
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(a) 
(a) Paul met Mary. 
(b) Mary met Paul. 




Ego Distance of Cognitive Units 




cognitive units may be referred to by nominal phrases, e.g. Paul, 
~,-friend, !.• telephone call, etc. A speaker is able to ·think 
of or attend to a great number of such units simultaneously. How-
ever, a speaker cannot and usually does not want to communicate all 
of what is present in his phenomenal field at one time. Linguistic 
production is, therefore. dependent upon the speaker's selective 
communicative intent and is also constrained by the necessity of 
linear chaining of the verbal units. Ertel assumes that one of 
the basic mental operations underlying sentence construction is 
what he calls "nominal seizing." The speaker seizes one and only 
one of the various nominal units of his cognitive phenomenal field 
relevant to what is going to be uttered. This "seized" cognitive 
unit is the primary reference point of the sentential construction 
and the rest of the sentence--the other nominal units included in 
it--are set relative to this basic reference point. This basic 
reference point, the seized nominal unit, becomes the grammatical 
subject of the constructed sentence. (Ertel 1977:146-147) 
Ertel (1977) goes on-to argue that nominal seizing in sen-
tence construction, on a more general level of abstraction, is 
similar to the mental operation governing overt manual grasping, 
i.e. taking hold of something in one's hand. For example, if I 
take hold of one object from several objects within my reach, the 
object in my hand differs from the other objects in one important 
respect: it is closer to my phenomenal ego. (Ertel 1977:147) 
Therefore; if the subject of a sentence represents a cognitive 
unit that has mentally seized by the speaker because of its close-
ness to the speaker's ego, one should expect to find empirical 
evidence of this relative closeness between gralllnatical subject 
and speaker's ego. Ertel himself has conducted several empirical 
studies in German designed to test predictions from the theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to report the results of a study 
replicating one of Ertel 's research designs for English and to 
extend Ertel's findings not only to English as a first language, 
but also to English as a foreign/second language. Such extension 
adds further support to Ertel 's claim that the choice of gramma-
tical subject is not so much specifically a linguistic process as 
a general cognitive process. 
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L1ethod 
Subjects. Two groups of subjects participated in this study. 
One was a group of fifty-two (52) adult native speakers of English, 
all undergraduate students at SIU-C, who were volunteers recruited 
from two General Studies courses. The other group consisted of 
sixty-five (65) intermediate/advanced adult students of English 
as a foreign/second language. all students at our intensive Center 
for English as a Second language on campus. These non-native 
speakers of English were a heterogeneous group from a variety of 
native language backgrounds. 
Procedure2. In a sentence interpretation task the subjects 
viewed two {2) pictures depicting a communcative situation. Cf. 
Figure 2, next page. Subjects were told that the speaker in the 
picture utters a sentence to his neighbor and refers to one of 
the two girls standing at the fence. The subject's task was to 
indicate to which girl the speaker refers. By pairing each of 
the two pictures with each of the six different sentences al so 
shown in Figure 2--three with the preposition in front of and 
three with the preposition behind--the sentences systematically 
varying the gran1natical subject and its position in the sentence. 
it was possible to test for the perspective from which the refer-
ence to the girl at the fence was interpreted. It should be noted 
that the prepositions in front of and behind may be interpreted 
from different persped"lves; as viewed-by the speaker, as viewed 
by the boys, as viewed by the girls, and even as viewed by the 
subject looking at the picture. In fact, the reason the two pic-
ture orientations shown in Figure 2 were used in the study was to 
control for any effect due to the subjects' own ego locations. 
The theory predicts that the sentence interpretations wi 11 be 
primarily from the perspective of the speaker in the picture; but, 
because of the close psychological association of the speaker's 
ego with the granmatical subject, the interpretation may also be 
from the perspective of the person being referred to by the gram-
matical subject of the sentence. There should be far fewer inter-
pretations from the perspective of other persons referred to by 
other nominal units in the sentence, e.g. by the granmmtical ob-
ject in the sentence. Therefore, for sentence (1) in which the 
pictured speaker refers to himself in the subject position (I am 
\'tatching ... ) the interpretation of the prepositions ought tot>e 
rrorntlle-perspective of the speaker. However, for sentence (2), 
in which the pictured speaker refers to Henry in the subject 
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(1) I am watching the girl standing in front of/behind the fence. 
(2) Henry is watching the girl standing in front of/behind the 
fence. 
(3) It is Henry whom the girl standing in front of/behind the 
fence is watching. 
Figure 2 
Sentence Interpretation Task 
Pictures and Sentences 
Adapted from Ertel (1977) 
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position, the interpretations of the prepositions may significantly 
shift from the speaker's perspective to the perspective of Henry, 
the grammatical subject. · 
Results 
Table l shows the mean number of interpretations of the refer-
ent for the girl who is standing in front of and behind the fence 
from the perspective of the pictured speaker for each of the three 
sentences. 
~roup Sentence No. Grammatical Subject Mean SPI* 
Ertel ( 1) "I" 3.77 
German (2) "Henry" 1.89 
(N=26) (3) "girl II 2.69 
Carrell ( 1) II I II 2.89 
Am. Eng. (2) "Henry" 1.29 
(N=52 (3) "girl II 2.04 
Carrell ( 1) II I II 2.68 
ESL (2) "Henry 11 1.50 
(N=65) (3) 11 gi rl II 1.88 
*SPI = Speaker Perspective Interpretation 




Speaker Perspective Interpretations 
Table 1 also compares the results of this study with those obtained 
by Ertel for comparable German sentences with native speakers of 
German. 
In none of the groups of subjects were there any considerable 
differences between Picture 1 and Picture 2, or between the prepo~ 
sitions in front of and behind; therefore, the results for these 
4-way differences are pooledfn reporting them in Table 1. Table l 
considers the subjects who participated in the study as independent 
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units and the number of speaker perspective interpretations (SPI) 
per sentence as the dependent variable; the potential range was 
0-4, with a maximum of 4. In other \'IOrds, there were four (4) 
sentences with_!_ as grammatical subject, four with !-fenr,Y_ as gram-
matical subject, and four with _gj_~ as grammatical subject; one 
each with picture 1 and the preposition in front of, one each 
with picture 1 and the preposition behind, one each with picture 2 
and the preposition in front of, and,fTnally, one each.with 
picture 2 and the preposition behind. The results are presented 
in terms of the mean number ofSPT's per sentence. 
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The main result for each group is the comparison of the number 
of SPI 's for the I-subject sentences ( 1) with the number of SPI 's 
for the llenry-subJect sentences (2). If the pictured speaker 
refers to himself in the subject position, the great majority of 
the subjects in each group interpreted the prepositions from the 
perspective of the speaker. From the speaker's perspective, in 
picture 1, the girl in front of the fence is Sue and the girl be-
hind the fence is Mary; in picture 2, vice versa. llowever, if the 
pictured speaker refers to Henry in the grammatical subject 
function, Henry always being on the opposite side of the fence from 
the pictured speaker, the number of subjects who chose the pictured 
speaker's perspective is considerably fewer. That is, many chose 
to interpret the prepositions from the opposite perspective, the 
perspective of Henry, the gra11111atical subject. Within each group 
of subjects, a test of significant differences in the mean number 
of SPI's for the I-subject sentences and for the Henry-subject 
sentences is statistically significant (p<.001, t-test). In 
other words, for each of the three groups of subjects in this and 
Ertel's study, there was a significant decrease in SPI's when the 
speaker and the grarranatical subject were not identical; in these 
cases interpretations could and did shift to come from the per-
spective of the grammatical subject. This is exactly what Ertel 's 
theory predicted would happen, because of the close cognitive 
connection between speaker and gramnatical subject. 
However, we should be aware, as was Ertel, that there is a 
possible alternative explanation for so many of the ~nry-subject 
sentence interpretations being from the point of view of the 
grammatical subject !!_~. They may, in fact, not be due to the 
subject role of Henry in the sentence, but to the fact that Henry 
is the first noun phrase. In other words, one could look at the 
_!_-sentence and Henry-sentence results and argue that the interpre-
tations are from the perspective of the first noun phrase in the 
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sentence and that the interpretations have nothing to do with the 
role of grammatical subject. It was in order to control for this 
possible effect of position that sentence (3) was used in the task. 
In sentence ( 3), as compared to sentence (2), Henry and the girl 
have exchanged their grammatical functions butfiOttheirrelallie 
positions in the sentence. If the prepositions are merely inter-
preted from the perspective of the person referred to in the first 
noun phrase position, there ought to be no difference in the mean 
number of SP I's between sentences ( 2) and ( 3). On the other hand, 
if the interpretations of the prepositions tend to be related to 
grawnatical function, there ought to be differences between sen-
tences (2) and (3), as well as between (1) and (3). 
What were the results for sentence (3)? for each group of 
subjects, the differences in the mean number of SPI • s for the 
!!~'!!:Y-subject (2) sentences and the .9.i!l-subject (3) sentences 
were statistically significant ( p < .05, t-test). (The differences 
between sentences (2) and (3) in the ESL group were not very great, 
and were only marginally significant for this group.} Sinrllarly, 
for each group of subjects, the differences between the mean num-
ber of SPI's for the I-subject sentences (1) and the _girl-subject 
sentences (3) were also highly statistically significant 
(p~.001, t-test). The fact that the means for sentence (3) with 
qirl-subject were significantly higher than for sentence (2) with 
Henr.x.-subject shows that there were considerably more interpreta-
tions of sentence (3) from the speaker perspective than in sen-
tence (2). However, the fact that the means for sentence (3) with 
girl-subject were significantly lower than for sentence (l) with 
I-subject shows that there were considerably fewer interpretations 
in· sentence (3) from the speaker perspective than in sentence (1). 
All of these results can be explained by referring to Figure 3. 
Cf. Figure 3, next page. 
Sentence (1), in which speaker perspective, grammatical sub-
ject perspective, and position as first noun phrase all coincide, 
clearly produces the highest number of SPI's. Sentence (2). in 
which the speaker and grammatical subject are not one and the 
same, but in which the grammatical subject is the first noun 
phrase, may cause shift in interpretation away from the speaker's 
perspective and toward the perspective of the grammatical subject, 
the first noun phrase. Note that this is not a shift toward the 
perspective of a gramnatical object, for if it were, we'd have 
found it in sentence (l). In sentence (3). in which the gramma-
tical subject is not the first but the second noun phrase, and 
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Sentence Grammatical 
No. Subject SPI Other I Sentence 
( 1) II I" { Speaker &ram. 06j. "I am watching =Gram. Subj. =2nd NP the girl standing 
=1st NP ="girl" in front of/behind 
:::"I" the fence." 
(2) "Henry" Speaker [Gram. Subj. "llenry is watching 
=1st NP the girl standing 





(3) "girl" Speaker { Gram.Obj. "It is Uenry whom 
=l st NP the girl standing 
="Henry" in front of /behind 






Coincidence of Perspectives, . 
Grarmiatical Function, and Sentence Position 
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in which the first noun phrase is, in fact, the grammatical ob-
ject, we see a slight shift back toward interpretation from the 
speaker's perspective, but not as strong a tendency to interpret 
from the speaker's perspective as in sentence (1). This suggests, 
of course, that the position of the grammatical subject in a sen-
tence has an additional effect, but that the role of granunatical 
subject is still a strong determiner of the perspective taken in 
sentence interpretation. 
Conclusions 
In sununary, the results of both Ertel 's and my findings lend 
support to the assumption that the cognitive unit underlying the 
grammatical subject noun phrase of a sentence is closer to the 
speaker's ego than that underlying an object noun phrase. Because 
of this close cognitive association of the speaker's ego to the 
gra~natical subject, in sentence production a speaker may give up 
his egocentric perspective and shift to the perspective of the 
person to whom he is referring in subject position, and in sen-
tence interpretation, the interpretation may shift from the pers-
pective of the speaker to the perspective of the person referred 
to in subject position. This tendency is not found with respect 
to persons to whom the speaker refers as grammatical objects in 
a sentence. 
In even more general terms, these results lend additional 
support to the view mentioned at the outset, that, at least in 
Western European languages like German and English, the role of 
grammatical subject is not merely an arbitrary, superficial, syn-
tactic role, but one with important cognitive significance as 
well. 
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